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WOMEN DIRECTORS ON PUBLIC COMPANY BOARDS: DOES A CRITICAL MASS AFFECT 
LEVERAGE? 
Cindy K. Harris, Ursinus College 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the relationship between corporate leverage (the ratio of total debt to total assets) and gender 
diversity on US public company boards, with particular focus on boards that have at least 25% women directors. 
Using this critical mass of women eliminates from consideration boards with lesser female representation, whose 
female directors may be marginalized in their contributions to board functioning and decision-making.  I 
hypothesize that when boards have this minimum threshold of gender diversity, the influence of risk-averse female 
directors will impact board decisions related to financing, resulting in lower debt ratios when compared to boards 
with no female directors. Drawn from the listing of firms compiled annually by Catalyst, the sample is comprised of 
Fortune 500 firms with no women on their board and firms with at least 25% women directors on their board, 
respectively, for the two year period 2012 and 2013. Using a total sample of 78 firms, and controlling for 
determinants of capital structure and board governance variables, I find a significant negative relationship between 
boards with at least 25% women directors and corporate leverage. Further, the presence of at least 25% women on 
the board has a significant moderating effect on the association between both board size and board age, and 
corporate leverage, leading to an even stronger negative relationship. The evidence suggests that substantial board 
gender diversity is a corporate governance factor that can influence firm outcomes, and adds insight into the factors 
that can affect corporate financing choices of US public companies. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The role of the board of directors is to protect shareholders’ interests by insuring that management is accountable for 
their decisions and actions. Boards act to reduce or eliminate the principal-agent problem through a variety of 
mechanisms and processes collectively described as corporate governance – they add value through advising the 
executive officers and monitoring management’s actions. Certainly, “the idea that experienced board members act as 
valuable monitors and advisors for CEOs and that firms seek directors who have particular backgrounds to 
maximize shareholder wealth” is a key component of corporate governance (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). 
 
Research on how boards function, make decisions and the effects of their monitoring role have long focused on 
board composition. As the number of women on corporate boards of directors has slowly grown, an emerging area 
of corporate governance research is examining how gender diversity of corporate boards influences board 
functioning and firm outcomes. Recent academic studies have chiefly focused on establishing the linkages between 
female representation on boards and aspects of corporate performance, including profitability, growth and 
shareholder value. The results have been inconsistent. Some have found no significant link between board diversity 
and firm performance, using two measures of profitability, Tobin’s Q and return on assets  (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009) (Rose, 2007). Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson (2010) observe a significant positive relationship 
between the number of women on all of the major board committees and return on assets (“ROA”.)  
 
In studies that examine the link between gender diversity of the board and firm performance, gender diversity is 
measured in a variety of ways.  Researchers have used count data (number of female directors) (Carter, D'Souza, 
Simkins, & Simpson, 2010), at least one female on the board (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) as well as a continuous 
measure of the percentage of women on the board (Rose, 2007) to test the relationship between the presence of 
female directors and a variety of financial performance outcomes. However, the sample data used in these studies 
was comprised of relatively low representation of female directors on boards. In 1996, women held only 10.2% of 
Fortune 500 board seats while 10 years later in 2005 that figure grew to just 14.7% (Catalyst).  Consequently, 
researchers have faced difficulty in isolating the impact of a single female director, or a very small group of female 
directors, on corporate performance (Bilimoria, 2006).  
Internationally, there is increased movement toward boardroom gender quotas. Being the first, in 2003 Norway 
passed a quota mandating 40% female directors effective in 2008. Countries that followed include Spain, Iceland 
and France with a 40% quota, and Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands with lower percentage quotas of 30-33% 
(Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). Malaysia has imposed a 30% quota for new appointments to boards 
 
 
(http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/03/economist-explains-14, 2014), while Germany is 
implementing a requirement of 30% of their non-executive board seats be held by women in 2016 
(http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-introduce-legal-quota-for-women-in-boardrooms-
8947277.html, 2013). Further, the European Commission is considering imposing quotas.  While no such 
groundbreaking policy exists in the United States, there is a national campaign by the organization 2020 Women on 
Boards urging the goal to increase the percentage of women on U.S. company boards to 20% or greater by the year 
2020. (http://www.2020wob.com/)  
 
Further, although there are a growing number of research papers that examine gender diversity in relation to firm 
performance, there are few studies that examine the link between the presence of female board directors on 
corporate boards and the relative amount of debt financing, and these studies do not specifically focus on US firms. 
There is some research that considers the link between female directors and insolvency risk as well as the 
composition of debt.  Wilson and Altanlar examine insolvency risk in their study of UK private companies using 
2007-2008 data, and find that having a higher ratio of female directors is associated with lower insolvency risk 
(Wilson & Altanlar, 2009). In a study of firms across 33 countries (in which the US represented 22% of the sample) 
using 2006-2010 data, Alves examines the relationship between board of director composition and firm financing 
mix. Findings noted that when the board chair is not an executive, there is “some evidence that a more gender 
diverse board of directors is associated with more long term financing” (Alves, Couto, & Francisco, 2014).     
In their study of mandated female representation on boards in Norway from 2001 to 2009, Ahern and Dittmar 
observed that the effect of the legislated 40% gender quota led firms to increase in size, undertake more acquisitions, 
increase leverage (defined as total liabilities divided by total assets), and decline in operating performance.  Since 
“boards of directors are likely to be involved with acquisition decisions and major changes to financial policies, and 
because boards became younger and less experienced” after the quota took effect, they assert that the increased 
participation of female directors on boards weakened board monitoring and advising. In addition, Ahern and Dittmar 
suggest the observed financial effects may be the result of male directors changing their behavior in response to the 
presence of more female board members. (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012) 
 
This research study addresses two research gaps in the literature. First, focusing on board gender diversity, it utilizes 
a critical threshold of female directors, expressed as 25% or more of the board, which may affect the dynamics of 
the board, thereby exerting a strong influence on corporate governance and in turn, firm outcomes. Rather than the 
mere presence of a female on the board, or a count of female directors, using this critical mass of women on the 
board “puts a higher standard of compositional diversity” on the board and avoids the likelihood of “gender-based 
token dynamics” (Bilimoria, 2006). Second, focusing only on US firms, the study considers the link between this 
critical percentage of female board directors (board diversity) and corporate leverage using Fortune 500 firms, 
providing new insight into a governance factor which may be an additional determinant of capital structure in the 
US.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the literature related to the effect of board diversity on corporate 
governance and firm outcomes is discussed, including gender differences in behavior, decision making and risk 
taking. Literature addressing capital structure theory follows. In section 3 the main hypothesis is presented. The 
sample data and model are presented in section 4, and section 5 presents the empirical results, analysis and 
discussion.  Section 6 and 7 outline the conclusions drawn from the study and its limitations, respectively.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Effect of Board Diversity on Corporate Governance and Firm Outcomes 
Gender differences in behavior have been observed in aspects of corporate governance. In a study over the period 
1996-2003, comparing S&P firms with at least one female director to those without, Adams & Ferreira observed that 
women appear to behave differently – they attend a higher percentage of committee and board meetings than their 
male counterparts, and the greater the fraction of women on the board, the better is attendance behavior of male 
directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Not only may women impact the behavior of their male peers on the board, but 
also “female directors could more closely correspond to the concept of the independent director emphasized in 
theory” since “they do not belong to the ‘old boys club’” (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). 
 
 
Are women the new ‘independent’ directors? When a director is independent, the director has no material 
relationship with the company, as a partner, shareholder or officer of an entity that has a relationship with the 
company (i.e. its subsidiary).  The importance of independence is that it ensures the director has no business 
interests that could otherwise interfere with exercising objective judgment in their oversight role.  In research prior 
to the minimum requirements for independence, the degree to which boards were comprised of independent 
directors was a corporate governance variable included in studies to gauge board effectiveness and oversight. 
However, since 2002, US publicly traded firms are required to have a majority of independent directors on its board. 
Given the slow but steady growth of women on corporate boards, it may be that the presence of female directors 
now plays a comparable role influencing the quality of board monitoring and decision-making that independent 
board directors previously played, when independence was not a mandate. In short, “gender diverse boards may be a 
better monitor of managers because women directors are more independent” than male directors (Simpson, Carter, 
& D'Souza, 2010). Since other researchers conclude that more independent boards tend to hold more debt (Alves, 
Couto, & Francisco, 2014), if female directors are viewed as the new proxy for independence, then one might expect 
firms with more women on their boards to have higher debt ratios.  
However, prior literature suggests that women are more conservative and risk averse than men, and exhibit less risky 
behavior in financial decisions.  Psychological research demonstrates that, in areas such as finance, men are more 
overconfident than women. They tend to overestimate the precision of their knowledge regarding the value of a 
financial security and “hold unrealistic beliefs about how high their returns will be and how precisely these can be 
estimated” (Barber & Odean, 2001).  In Barber and Odean’s study conducted for the period 1991-1997, they observe 
that men traded stock investments 45% more frequently than women, and realized lower net returns from excessive 
trading than women, especially among single men. In a similar vein, empirical evidence from a study by Huang 
using executive data (CEO and CFO) from 1993-2005 reveals that male executives exhibit relative overconfidence 
in significant corporate decision making compared with women. In particular male executives undertake more 
acquisitions and issue debt more often than female executives. (Huang & Kisgen, 2013) 
Relevant corporate governance research further supports the effects of gender differences on firm outcomes related 
to debt. Research by Palvia et al (2013) find that female CEOs and board chairs in US banks assess risk more 
conservatively and hold higher levels of equity capital and reduce default risk during periods of market stress. They 
observe that “female executives and directors are less overconfident in their risk assessments and may inherently 
promote more conservative business strategies that reduce bank default risk” (Palvia, Vahamaa, & Vahamaa). 
Wilson (2009) finds that the ratio of female directors on boards is associated with a lower risk of insolvency in 
private companies, “providing support to the concept that women are more risk-aware or risk-averse and can add 
value to the management and decision-making capability of the company.”  
Capital Structure Theories 
 
Capital structure, or leverage, refers to the degree to which firms finance through borrowing or debt rather than 
through the issuance of stock to support operating and investing activity and increase profitability. Two fundamental 
theories exist in the corporate finance literature, which explain the factors influencing leverage. These are the trade-
off theory and the pecking order theory. These theories can predict different management behaviors in relation to 
financing choices, particularly in relation to the effect of board of directors’ composition on those choices (Alves, 
Couto, & Francisco, 2014) 
 
The trade-off theory suggests that firm’s evaluate the costs and benefits of each source of financing, debt versus 
equity, in deciding how much of each to utilize. In short, firms seek an optimal balance of debt while considering the 
positive effects of the debt tax shield (savings from deductibility of interest payments to debt holders) as well as its 
costs in the form of bankruptcy risk or financial distress (Alkhatib, 2012). However, debt holders are not able to 
exercise control on the use of funds they provide, since managers may act in their own interests or in the interests of 
stockholders, thereby potentially increasing the riskiness of the firm’s asset investments. Thus, effective corporate 
governance is essential to insure that management acts as an agent for company shareholders when selecting and 
maintain an appropriate balance of financing.  
  
Unlike the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory does not predict firms seek a target leverage ratio. Instead, the 
theory relates to the preferred order in which firms seek funding sources. Firms favor internal funding (retained 
earnings) to external sources; within external sources, firms seek debt financing before equity financing, due to the 
 
 
relatively cheaper cost of financing through debt. Further, within debt, firms prefer short-term debt over long-term 
debt (Myers, 1984). The order of preference stems from information asymmetries between managers and outside 
investors (Alves, Couto, & Francisco, 2014). Use of internal financing allows managers to pursue new investment 
opportunities without the repercussions of external financing.  
 
Under the pecking order theory, short-term debt and long-term debt financing are ranked second and third, 
respectively, while financing through internal and external equity sources are ranked first and last, respectively. This 
paper is examining the effect of board gender diversity on corporate leverage, defined as the sum of short-term and 
long-term debt divided by total assets.  Since ranking is not relevant to the analysis, the paper relies on the trade-off 
theory of capital structure. Given the research findings of the observed differences between decision-making and 
risk preference of women versus men, female directors may influence how firms assess the optimal balance of debt 
and equity financing. Models of capital structure that focus on firm characteristics alone miss this important factor 
for explaining differences in firm behavior. (Huang & Kisgen, 2013) 
HYPOTHESES 
This research study considers the impact of gender diversity on US corporate board functioning through substantial 
female director representation, and examines its effect on the corporate leverage (the sum of short-term and long-
term debt divided by total assets). In particular, I expect boards with a critical mass of female directors - at least 25% 
- to be associated with a lower amount of leverage than corporate boards with no female directors. Given females’ 
differences in behavior as well as predilection to assume less risk, corporate boards with greater gender diversity 
will seek to avoid the potential bankruptcy costs and financial distress associated with debt financing and pursue 
alternative sources of funding. As such, relying on the trade-off theory of capital structure, companies with gender 
diverse boards are expected to have a lower optimal balance of debt financing relative to total assets. In addition, it 
is expected that the presence of this critical mass of women on the board will interact with other corporate 
governance variables, impacting their influence on corporate leverage. Specifically, the presence of at least 25% 
female directors on the board is expected to moderate the association between both average board age and average 
board size and corporate leverage, resulting in a lower debt ratio.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of a gender diverse corporate board of directors, measured as at least 25% female 
directors on the board, is negatively associated with the corporate leverage (the debt-to-asset ratio.) 
 
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a gender diverse corporate board of directors, measured as at least 25% female 
directors on the board, decreases the association between both board age and board size on corporate leverage 
(the debt-to-asset ratio.) 
 
SAMPLE DATA AND MODEL 
Sample Data  
 
This study builds on a sample of firms drawn from two census lists compiled annually by Catalyst: Fortune 500 
companies with zero women directors and Fortune 500 companies with 25% or more women directors.  
(http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2012-catalyst-census-fortune-500-women-board-directors) 
(http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2013-catalyst-census-fortune-500-women-board-directors).  The sample is 
comprised of firms that are on each Catalyst list in both 2012 and 2013 and for which financial and corporate 
governance data is available for both years. Industry SIC codes, financial statement data, and financial ratios were 
obtained from the Mergent Online database (“Mergent”). Corporate governance data was found in the firm’s annual 
proxy filings and annual reports.  
 
Financial firms (with SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded from the sample because they are subject to specific 
capital requirement regulations that can potentially influence their financing choices (Alves, Couto, & Francisco, 
2014).  The initial sample of non-financial firms results in 110 companies. Other exclusions include firms whose 
corporate structure changed in 2013 (mergers, spinoffs), firms not subject to standard corporate reporting 
requirements (REIT, limited partnerships), firms with abnormal debt ratios (near or exceeding 100% and with 
negative stockholders’ equity), and firms for which information was unavailable. Table 1 summarizes the 
construction of the final sample of 78 Fortune 500 firms, which includes 23 companies with zero women directors 
 
 
(“all- male” boards) in both years (2012 and 2013), and 55 companies with at least 25% women directors (“diverse” 
boards) in both years.   
 
TABLE 1: CONSTRUCTION OF SAMPLE 
  
Firms with ≥25%  
Women Directors 
“Diverse Boards” 
 
Firms with Zero 
Women Directors 
“All Male Boards” 
 
 
Total 
Sample 
Firms listed on Catalyst Census in 2012 and 2013  68 42 110 
Financial firms 9 4 13 
Corporate change (spinoff, merger) 3 4 7 
Non-corporate structure (partnership, REIT) 1 5 6 
No Proxy filing  0 2 2 
Long-term debt ratios near or exceeding 100% 0 2 2 
Other 0 2 2 
Sample total 55 23 78 
 
Table 2 summarizes the industry breakdown by each subgroup and for the total sample. In both subgroups as well as 
the total sample, the majority of firms are in the manufacturing sector. While firms with diverse boards are least 
represented in mining and construction, their second largest concentration is in wholesale and retail trade.  Firms 
with all-male boards also have their second largest concentrations are in wholesale and retail trade as well as 
transportation, communication and utilities, but in contrast, are least represented in the services category. 
 
TABLE 2: INDUSTRY BREAKDOWN BY SUBGROUP AND SAMPLE 
 
SIC code  (Industry) 
Firms with ≥25%  
Women Directors 
“Diverse Boards” 
Firms with Zero 
Women Directors 
“All Male Boards” 
 
Total Sample 
 count % Count % Count % 
1000-1999 (Mining, Construction) 2 4% 3 13% 5 6% 
2000-3999 (Manufacturing) 28 51% 10 44% 38 49% 
4000-4999 (Transportation, 
Communication, Utilities) 
6 11% 4 17% 10 13% 
5000-5999  
(Wholesale, Retail Trade) 
12 22% 4 17% 16 21% 
7000-8999 (Services) 7 13% 2 9% 9 11% 
Total 55 100% 23 100% 78 100% 
 
Table 3 reports the average number of female directors in firms with diverse boards by industry sector for the two-
year period 2012 and 2013. In both years, every industry has at least 3 women on their board and the highest average 
representation of women is in the manufacturing and transportation sector. 
 
TABLE 3:     AVERAGE NUMBER OF WOMEN DIRECTORS BY INDUSTRY IN “DIVERSE BOARDS” 
(FIRMS WITH ≥ 25% WOMEN DIRECTORS)  
SIC code  (Industry) 2012 2013 
1000-1999 (Mining, Construction) 3.00 3.00 
2000-3999 (Manufacturing) 3.57 3.57 
4000-4999 (Transportation, Communication, Utilities) 3.83 3.50 
5000-5999 (Wholesale, Retail Trade) 3.25 3.33 
7000-8999 (Services) 3.43 3.43 
 
 Model and Dependent Variable 
 
The regression model used in this paper is as follows: 
DebtAsset13 =  B0 + B1FemaleDir12 + B2Board characteristics (BDSize12, BDAge12, CDual12) +  
 
 
B3Determinants of Debt Financing (Risk (LogRev12), Growth (TAGrowth), Profitability (ROA12), 
Asset Tangibility (PPEtoTA12), Non-debt Tax Shield (TaxShield12) +  
B4 Industry + FemaleDir12*BDSize + FemaleDir12*BDAge12 
The debt to asset ratio (DebtAsset13) is measured as the book value of total debt divided by total assets as reported 
by Mergent for the fiscal year end 2013. Total debt is the sum of reported short-term and long-term debt, but does 
not include current liabilities, so as to account for only interest-bearing debt. The independent variables are 
measured for the fiscal year 2012. The one-year lag is used to reflect that the characteristics of the board and its 
composition influence decisions that may have an impact in a subsequent period. Likewise, financing decisions are 
made based on earlier measures of a firm’s financial position. 
 
Independent variable: Critical Mass of Female Directors 
 
This paper hypothesizes that the gender diversity of a company’s board of directors affects the board’s selection of 
corporate financing as measured by the debt-to-asset ratio. Board diversity is measured using a dummy variable to 
capture a critical threshold of female directors (i.e. at least 25% female directors) in order to measure the effect of 
substantial female representation on the board. 
 
In firms where there is only one woman on the board, she may be perceived as a token, having no substantive impact 
on financial outcomes (Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009).  Findings from prior studies examining the impact of board 
gender diversity on board governance and firm financial outcomes were limited by the lower levels of female board 
representation, which led to mixed findings of the impact of female directors on the board. To improve investigating 
the impact of board gender diversity, Simpson, Carter, and D’Souza (2010) assert that “a threshold or critical mass 
of women on the board or a dummy variable may be preferable.”  Bilmoria used a dummy variable for women 
corporate officers, to examine the relationship between women corporate directors and women corporate officers 
noting that a “critical mass of women in the senior management team (25% or more) serves as a measure of whether 
women are considered real, not token, contributors to the operations of the top executive team” (Bilimoria, 2006)  
Further, Post, Rahman, and Rubow (2011) find that “three women on the board (versus a percentage) seems to be a 
critical threshold and at that level there are positive associations with corporate social responsibility” (Post, Rahman, 
& Rubow, 2011). 
 
FemaleDir12 is a dummy variable where ‘1’ signifies that female directors comprise at least 25% of the board of 
directors and ‘0’ signifies a board with zero female directors. As noted in prior research, utilizing a dummy variable 
that captures a critical threshold of female board directors may provide a clearer measure of the impact of board 
gender diversity on firm financial outcomes. Using this binary measure of female board presence suggests that the 
female directors are not likely to be mere window dressing of the board; rather, using the critical level of at least 
25% females on the board increases the likelihood that female directors can make true contributions to board 
functioning and influence the board decision making process.  
 
The presence of a critical mass of female directors may enhance their influence on the board’s decision making 
process related to financing. Given females’ demonstrated differences in behavior as well as their risk-averse or risk-
avoidance preference, corporate boards with substantial gender diversity will avoid the risks of debt financing and 
pursue alternative sources of funding, relying more heavily on internal sources of funds (retained earnings) or equity 
financing (issuance of stock). Consequently, a negative association is expected between FemaleDir12 and corporate 
leverage. 
 
Control Variables: Board Characteristics 
 
The board characteristic variables used in this study are traditional measures found in the corporate governance 
literature. These characteristics can affect the quality of oversight and the nature of decision-making by board 
directors, impacting firm outcomes. 
A. Board Size 
Board size is a variable associated with the number of links the board has to its environment (Johnson, Schnatterly, 
& Hill, 2013). It has been argued that board size can affect the efficiency of board functioning in one of two ways. 
One view is that larger firms have larger boards in order to meet the needs of more complex business transactions 
 
 
and decision making and consequently, board oversight is positively associated with its size (Alves, Couto, & 
Francisco, 2014).  The alternate argument is larger boards may experience “poorer communication and increased 
decision making time associated with larger groups” resulting in a less effective monitoring role (Morales, Ballesta, 
& Meca). Underlying this latter assertion is the notion that directors who are more dissimilar could disagree, 
creating more board conflict and too much board monitoring, negatively impacting firm financial outcomes. One 
study noted that among “companies with a market capitalization of at least $10 billion, typically those with the 
smallest boards generated better shareholder returns” (Lublin, 2014).  
BDSize12 represents the total number of directors on the board at the fiscal year end 2012. Given the competing 
arguments on the impact of board size on corporate governance, no prediction is made as to the relationship between 
board size and corporate leverage.  
B. Average Board Age 
BDAge12 is the average age of the board directors at the fiscal year end 2012, calculated by dividing the sum of all 
director ages by the number of directors on the board. This personal characteristic of a board member is a proxy for 
experience, reflecting the director’s ability to effectively monitor and advise (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012).  Further, age 
may also be correlated with risk aversion (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013).  As observed by Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012), in Norway, younger boards that resulted from the addition of younger, less experienced female directors was 
associated with increased leverage. Given this observation, a negative association between average board age and 
corporate leverage is predicted.   
C. CEO Duality  
An important indicator of CEO power over a board is CEO duality (Baliga & Moyer, 1996), a term used to describe 
a combined leadership structure where the same individual holds both the position of board chair and CEO.  CEO 
duality is typically included in studies examining the effects of corporate governance on firm outcomes, but its 
impact has been mixed.  Advocates of CEO duality cite the value added as a result of a single, unified leadership 
position and note that adequate independent oversight of management can be achieved through other appropriate 
board mechanisms, measures and activities.  Opponents of CEO duality argue it leads to CEO entrenchment, which 
“occurs when managers gain so much power that they are able to use the firm to further their own interests rather 
than the interests of shareholders” (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). With less board control over management, CEO 
duality can restrict the monitoring role of the board as directors may become more acquiescent.  
 
CDual12 represents whether the CEO of the corporation is also the board chair for the fiscal year end 2012. 
CDual12 is a dummy variable where ‘1’ signifies that CEO duality exists and ‘0’ signifies split leadership. With 
regard to capital structure, some studies find that firms are more leveraged when managers are more entrenched 
while others have found that firms with entrenched CEOs use less leverage and short term debt (Alves, Couto, & 
Francisco, 2014). Since prior research results are mixed regarding CEO duality impact on firm performance 
measures as well as levels of corporate debt, no prediction is made as to the relationship between CEO duality and 
corporate leverage. 
 
Control Variables: Determinants of debt  
 
Consistent with prior research on financing choices and cost of debt financing, the following control variables are 
included in the analysis as determinants of a firm’s capital structure and its financing choices. 
A. Risk 
Firm size has been identified by capital structure literature as one of the determinants of financing mix (Frank & 
Goral, 2009). Given its size and tendency to be more diversified, a larger firm is less likely to default on its debt or 
be prone to bankruptcy, and thus has lower risk. Consequently, since a larger firm is more likely to rely more on 
debt financing than a smaller firm, a positive relationship is expected between firm size and leverage. 
  
Firm size is measured using the log of total revenues for fiscal year end 2012 (LogRev12). Measuring firm size with 
the one year lag acknowledges “the spurious relation between size and the debt ratio that arises because of the 
relation between size and past profitability (profitable firms become larger) and the short-term relation between 
profitability and leverage (profitable firms increase their net worth).”  (Titman & Wessels, 1988).  
 
 
 
B. Growth 
Growth is measured by the percentage increase in total assets (TAGrowth) for the period from fiscal year end 2012 
to fiscal year end 2013. Annual percentage growth in the firms’ total assets is an indicator of a firm’s financial 
strength and may increase its financing demands. Results are mixed in terms of the relationship between growth and 
leverage, with some studies revealing a positive outcome and others a negative association (Alkhatib, 2012). 
Consequently, no prediction is made regarding the association between growth and the debt ratio.  
C. Profitability 
Profitability is measured using Return on Assets for fiscal year end 2012 (ROA12) as reported by Mergent. 
Specifically, the ratio reflects the annual net income divided by average total assets for the period. Measuring 
profitability in the earlier year (2012) acknowledges the likelihood that profitability has more than just a short-term 
immediate effect on the observed leverage ratio (Titman & Wessels, 1988). While firms with higher profits generate 
higher retained earnings, reducing their need for debt financing, higher profits can also provide those firms with 
greater access to lower cost debt financing, motivating those firms to seek greater leverage. Consequently, no 
prediction is made regarding the association between profitability and the debt ratio.  
D. Tangibility of assets 
The ratio of total property, plant and equipment (net) to total assets at the fiscal year end 2012 (PPEtoTA12) is used 
to measure the tangibility of firm assets. Such assets are long-term, substantial investments by the firm, which 
generally require significant amounts of financing. Firms with a larger investment in property, plant and equipment 
have greater collateral, increasing their ability to issue debt secured by property. Findings by Alves and Ferreira 
(2011) suggest a strong, positive relationship is expected between asset tangibility and firm leverage.  
E. Non-debt Tax Shield 
TaxShield12 represents the ratio of depreciation expense to total property, plant and equipment (net) for the fiscal 
year end 2012, and is used to measure the non-debt tax shield. Tax deductions for depreciation are substitutes for the 
tax benefits of debt financing (i.e. interest expense deduction), and as such, “firms with large non-debt tax shields 
relative to their expected cash flow include less debt in their capital structure.” (Titman & Wessels, 1988) Firms 
which have the tax savings benefit of larger tax deductions for depreciation have less motivation to borrow. 
Therefore, TaxShield12 is expected to be negatively associated with the debt-to-asset ratio.  
F. Industry 
Industry is the company’s classification according to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), obtained from 
Mergent. The five industries referenced in this study are mining (mining and construction), manufacturing, 
communication (transportation, communication, and utilities), retail trade (wholesale and retail trade) and services. 
Each industry is represented by a dummy variable for that industry and the services industry is withheld from the 
model for comparison purposes. It is expected that industry will have a positive relationship with corporate leverage, 
since relative to the services industry the other sectors will have different levels of asset investment and will seek a 
different optimal balance of debt financing.   
EMPIRICAL RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Means of the dependent variable and independent variables discussed above are presented for each subgroup in 
Tables 4A, 4B and for the total sample in Table 4C.   
 
In this sample, the average debt to asset ratio in 2013 reveals that firms with at least 25% female directors carry an 
average debt ratio that is more than 3% lower than firms with no female directors. The debt ratio of firms with 
diverse boards and all male boards is 25.01% and 28.24%, respectively. For both diverse and all-male boards, the 
minimum debt ratio is zero. The maximum ratio for diverse boards is 61.91% in contrast to a maximum ratio of 
81.99% for all male boards. While the average dollar amount of total debt in 2013 for firms with diverse boards is 
more than twice that for the all-male boards, in both years the average total assets for diverse boards is more than 
three times the average total assets of all-male boards. The percentage of female directors in diverse boards ranges 
from 25% to 46.7%, with an average of 31.18% in 2012.  
 
 
 
The difference in the financial measures of asset growth and sales are important to note. The average annual growth 
rate of total assets for firms with diverse boards is 4.01% as compared to TAGrowth of 12.22% for all-male boards. 
Likewise, the average 2012 revenue for firms with diverse boards is more than three times the level for all-male 
boards. 
 
Other financial measures are quite similar between the two subgroups in this sample. The average ROA12 is 5.17% 
for firms with diverse boards and 5.45% for all-male boards.  The average PPEtoTA12 is nearly the same, with 
27.70% for firms with diverse boards and 28.17% for all-male boards. Similarly, the average TaxShield12 is nearly 
the same, with 3.09% for firms with diverse boards versus 3.18% for all-male boards. 
 
With regard to corporate governance variables, the average BDAge12 for all-male boards is 62.66 years, 
approximately one year older than the average age of 61.52 years for diverse boards. Within diverse boards, 
however, male directors on average are nearly three years older than female directors; female directors’ average age 
is 59.58 versus male directors’ average age of 62.48. Nearly half of all-male boards have CEO duality (11 out of 23 
firms) whereas 65% of diverse boards have this leadership structure (36 out of 55). Further, the average board size 
of diverse boards is 11.18 members, while the all-male boards have an average of 9.30 directors.  
TABLE 4A: ALL MALE BOARDS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
DebtAsset13%            28.24             21.18                  -                 81.99  
FemaleDir12% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BdSize12              9.30               1.64             6.00               12.00  
MAge12            62.66               5.54           49.40               71.10  
CDual12%            48.00             51.08  n/a n/a 
Rev12 ('000) $9,086,483 $4,582,280 $4,850,500 $20,090,724 
TAGrowth%            12.22             21.03         (12.52)              79.10  
ROA12%              5.45               6.01            (5.94)              19.26  
PPEtoTA12%            28.17             22.31             3.63               85.37  
TaxShield12%              3.18               2.73             0.55               11.60  
     
     
TABLE 4B: DIVERSE BOARDS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
DebtAsset13%            25.01             13.77                  -                 61.91  
FemaleDir12%            31.18               6.13           25.00               46.67  
BdSize12            11.18               1.81             7.00               17.00  
BDAge12            61.52               2.91           51.60               66.90  
CDual12%            65.45             47.99  n/a n/a 
Rev12 ('000) $30,314,024 $35,399,093 $83,680 $152,256,000 
TAGrowth%              4.01             13.36         (36.12)              48.76  
ROA12%              5.17               6.83         (21.11)              21.08  
PPEtoTA12%            27.70             21.84             2.64               82.56  
TaxShield12%              3.09               1.86             0.42               11.30  
     
 
 
 
    
 
 
TABLE 4C: TOTAL SAMPLE: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
DebtAsset13%            25.96             16.23                  -                 81.99  
NumFDir12              2.45               1.74                  -                    7.00  
BdSize12            10.63               1.95             6.00               17.00  
BDAge12            61.85               3.87           49.40               71.10  
CDual12%            60.26             49.25  0% 100% 
Rev12 ('000) $24,054,621 $31,300,192 $83,680 $152,256,000 
TAGrowth%              6.43             16.30         (36.12)              79.10  
ROA12%              5.25               6.56         (21.11)              21.08  
PPEtoTA12%            27.84             21.83             2.64               85.37  
TaxShield12%              3.12               2.13             0.42               11.60  
 
Additional sample statistics are provided in Table 5 and Table 7. Table 5 provides the sample means for the 
independent and dependent variables by industry sector. Table 7 provides the Pearson correlation matrix for the 
variables, revealing no significant correlations among the variables included in this study. See Table 7 in the 
appendix. 
TABLE 5: SAMPLE MEANS BY INDUSTRY 
 Mining Manufacturing Communication Retail 
Trade 
Service 
DebtAsset13 (%) 22.52% 24.94% 40.60% 24.65% 18.30% 
FemaleDir12 (% of firms 
within industry) 
40.00% 73.68% 60.00% 75.00% 77.78% 
BDSize12 (count) 9.80 11.00 10.60 10.13 10.44 
BDAge12 (years) 66.13 61.66 60.84 62.05 61.09 
CDual12 (%) 60.00% 68.42% 50.00% 43.75% 66.67% 
Rev12 (in thousands) $10,356,003 $23,996,792 $18,205,589 $35,711,284 $17,685,094 
TAGrowth (%) 16.54% 7.93% 4.02% 2.00% 5.06% 
ROA12 (%) 3.73% 6.91% 1.26% 4.61% 4.67% 
PPEtoTA12 (%) 58.34% 20.11% 51.24% 28.37% 16.62% 
TaxShield12 (%) 4.31% 2.67% 3.82% 2.99% 2.95% 
 
Regression Results, Analysis and Discussion       
The empirical results are summarized in Table 6, providing the coefficients and p-values for the independent 
variables for the basic regression (with no interaction terms) and the regression with interaction terms 
(FemaleDir12*BDSize12 and FemaleDir12*BDAge). These empirical findings are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
See Table 6 in the Appendix.  
 
The result in the basic regression for the variable FemaleDir12 is consistent with the prediction, and supports 
Hypothesis 1. The variable FemaleDir12 reveals a negative and statistically significant coefficient (-6.01, p-value 
.08), meaning that boards with at least 25% women directors are associated with a debt to asset ratio that is 6% 
lower than boards with no women directors. The corporate governance variables, board size (BDSize12) and board 
age (BDAge12) are highly statistically significant. Board size is positively associated with corporate leverage, 
although the coefficient (2.1, p-value .03) reflects a relatively small impact. The results estimate that an increase in 
the board size by one director is associated with an increase in the debt ratio of 2.1%. In short, larger boards are 
associated with slightly higher leverage.  Similarly, the coefficient on board age is small, but statistically significant 
(-.64, p-value .05). This inverse relationship with corporate leverage suggests that an increase in average board age 
 
 
by one year is associated with a decrease of less than 1% in the debt to asset ratio. In short, older boards are 
associated with marginally lower leverage. The corporate governance variable CEO duality (CDual12) does not 
have a statistically significant association with corporate leverage.  
 
TABLE 6: EMPIRICAL RESULTS1 
  
Basic Regression 
Regression with  
Interaction Terms2 
 coefficient p-value coefficient p-value 
FemaleDir12  -6.01 .0808* -98.17 .0224** 
BDSize12  2.10 .0327** 3.17 .0681* 
BDAge12  -.64 .0508** -1.35 .0123*** 
CDual12  1.97 .5553 2.06 .5340 
Log(Rev12)  -1.73 .0748* -1.71 .0514** 
TAGrowth .19 .0082*** .20 .0084* 
ROA12  -.75 .0004* -.68 .0006*** 
PPEtoTA12  .13 .0816* .15 .0638* 
TaxShield12  1.91 .0048*** 2.03 .0011*** 
Mining -4.60 .2856 -3.27 .3506 
Manufacturing 6.83 .0537** 6.90 .0549** 
Communication 10.77 .0606* 7.85 .1277 
RetailTrade 7.91 .0797* 7.48 .1000* 
FemaleDir12*BDSize12   -2.04 .1542 
FemaleDir12*BDAge12   1.82 .0035 
Adjusted R2 .2954 .3304 
Significance level 1%***,  5%**, 10%* 
 
While all of the financial control variables are statistically significant, the value of the coefficients suggests a 
relatively immaterial impact on corporate leverage. In addition, the signs on the coefficients for both Log(Rev12) 
and TaxShield12 are the opposite of the predicted sign. While firm size as measured by Log(Rev12) was expected to 
be positively associated with the debt ratio, the results reflect a negative coefficient (-1.73, p-value .07).  Thus, while 
larger firms that generally bear less risk of default are expected to have a higher debt ratio, these results reflect a 
negative association with the debt ratio. However, the small coefficient indicates a relatively immaterial impact on 
the relationship. While TaxShield12 was expected to be negatively associated with the debt ratio, the results reflect a 
positive coefficient (1.91, p-value .005). Similarly, the small coefficient indicates a relatively immaterial impact on 
the debt ratio.  Given the lower interest rates in 2012, it may be that firms with higher depreciation expense relative 
to total property, plant and equipment still pursued debt financing. The depreciation deduction is not a substitute for 
the interest expense deduction, when debt financing can be obtained at a low cost. 
  
There is an observed statistically significant relationship between three industry sectors and the debt ratio. Relative 
to the service industry, manufacturing, communication and retail trade all reflect a positive relationship with 
corporate leverage. These results clearly indicate there are industry norms for financing that can influence a 
particular firm’s leverage.  
 
The regression with interaction terms expands the analysis to consider whether the presence of 25% or more female 
directors moderates the association between board size and board age, respectively, and corporate leverage. As with 
the basic regression, the result for the regression with interaction terms for the variable FemaleDir12 is consistent 
with the prediction, and supports Hypothesis 1. The coefficient    (-98.17, p-value .02) indicates that the presence of 
25% or more women directors on the board is associated with a lower debt-to-asset ratio. Further, in this regression, 
the coefficients on the control variables for board age and board size and the financial determinants of debt reported 
                                                          
1 Both regressions reflect correction for heteroscedasticity.  
2 Interaction terms were tested for joint significance with FemaleDir12; when tested together, both terms are 
statistically significant (F value=.064), but when tested one at a time with FemaleDir12, neither term is significant. 
 
 
 
 
the same signs as in the basic regression. With the exception of communication, the same industries maintained their 
statistical significance. 
 
The coefficients on the interaction terms reflect opposite outcomes from each other. The negative coefficient on the 
interaction term FemaleDir12*BDSize12 is not statistically significant (-2.04, p-value .15).  Nonetheless, the 
direction of the coefficient suggests when boards are larger and there is greater gender diversity on the board, it may 
be associated with a lower debt ratio. In contrast, the positive coefficient on the interaction term 
FemaleDir12*BDAge12 is statistically significant (1.82, p-value .003). This result reflects that given average board 
age, when there is greater gender diversity on the board, it is associated with a higher debt ratio.  
 
Statistical tests were run to test the joint significance of each interaction term individually with the variable 
FemaleDir12, using sample mean values for each variable. In both instances, the results proved not to be statistically 
significant. However, when both interaction terms are included and tested for their joint significance with the 
variable FemaleDir12, using sample mean values for each variable, the results are statistically significant (F-value 
.06). Thus, given average board size of 10.63 directors and average board age of 61.85 years, the presence of at least 
25% female directors on the board is associated with a debt ratio that is 7.29% lower than the debt ratio for all male 
boards. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. The presence of this critical mass of female directors has a moderating 
effect on both board size and board age (at their respective means) and further reduces the debt ratio from the 
reported 6% in the basic regression.  
 
These results indicate the opposite interaction effect of FemaleDir12 with board size and board age, respectively. 
When a board is larger and comprised of at least 25% female directors, it is associated with lower corporate 
leverage. The substantial cohort of female directors appears to be influencing board decision making to select lower 
levels of debt relative to total assets. This result is consistent with the argument that female directors are bringing 
their risk-averse attitude to board discussions, influencing boards to seek a lower level of optimal debt financing. On 
the other hand, when a board is on average older in age and comprised of at least 25% female directors, it is 
associated with higher corporate leverage. In this circumstance, the substantial cohort of female directors appears to 
be impacting board decision making to select greater levels of debt relative to total assets. This outcome is consistent 
with the argument that female directors, who may have less experience than male directors, are influencing boards to 
seek higher debt financing. In this sample, female directors are on average 3 years younger than male directors. 
However, when the two interaction terms are considered together with FemaleDir12, the effect of risk-averse female 
directors more than offsets the effect of less experienced, younger female directors, resulting in an increased 
negative association between board gender diversity and corporate leverage.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
“Boards around the world are under increasing pressure to choose female directors” (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). The 
rationale for inclusion of women on boards is that it can lead to positive outcomes in terms of corporate governance, 
which impacts firm performance as well as value to shareholders. Competent women are not substitutes for 
traditional corporate directors with identical abilities and talents; rather they have unique characteristics that create 
additional value (Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010) 
The results of this study reveal that when boards have a minimum threshold of gender diversity, defined as 25% or 
more female directors, the influence of risk-averse female directors will impact board decisions related to financing, 
resulting in lower debt ratios when compared to boards with no female directors. Using this critical mass of women 
eliminates from consideration boards with lesser female representation, whose female directors may be marginalized 
in their contributions to board functioning and decision-making.  Further, the presence of at least 25% women on the 
board has a significant moderating effect on the association between both board size and board age, respectively, 
and corporate leverage. Overall, the presence of this critical mass of female directors interacts with these two board 
characteristics, resulting in an increased negative association, as indicated by the estimated lower debt ratio. The 
evidence suggests that substantial board gender diversity is a corporate governance factor that can influence firm 
outcomes, and adds insight into the factors that can affect corporate financing choices of US public companies. 
 
Although their numbers have steadily grown, women are an underrepresented group on boards of directors in the 
U.S. despite their decades of participation in the workforce. If women are given a greater voice and ability to 
contribute at the board level, companies can potentially realize the benefits of their leadership. In short, “gender 
 
 
diversity on boards may lead to freer expression of ideas, especially when women have power” thereby enhancing 
financial policy decision making (Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2013). 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This study highlights the empirical association between a critical mass of female directors on US public company 
boards and corporate leverage. However, it does not suggest a causal relationship. The endogenous nature of 
corporate boards limits the interpretation of the results of this research study. Endogeneity concerns arise because of 
omitted unobservable firm characteristics (Adams & Ferreira, 2009).  It is difficult to determine if firms with lower 
leverage are generally larger, and simply attract more female directors (who self-select) to their larger boards or 
whether female board members contribute to board monitoring functions and decision making, which leads to lower 
levels of debt financing relative to total assets.  Clearly, firm attributes are likely to affect both the incentives of 
women to join their boards and the incentives of firms to include female directors on their boards.  
“Board composition is not exogenously determined but rather is affected by prior decisions and firm characteristics 
that in turn affect board decisions. Thus, any observed relationship between board composition and firm outcomes 
may in fact be caused by the factors that determined the board composition in the first place” (Johnson, Schnatterly, 
& Hill, 2013).  
 
Nonetheless this research reflects the strong negative association that exists between corporate leverage in Fortune 
500 companies and a critical mass of female directors on the board. One way in which this study can be enhanced is 
to expand the analysis to include firms whose board of directors has at least one female director or a percentage of 
female directors below the minimum threshold of 25% used in this paper. With the growing participation of women 
on corporate boards, a continuous measure or a step-function of the percentage of female board directors may now 
yield more relevant results that were not observed in earlier studies due to the relatively low number of female board 
directors.  Another way to expand this research is to consider a longer lag period, as a one year lag may not be 
sufficient to infer a consistent connection between the critical mass of female directors on corporate boards and a 
firm’s debt ratio. Last, given the significant association of industry with the debt ratio observed in this study, 
narrowing the focus to a larger sample drawn from a single, specific industry may also yield informative results 
about the impact of board gender diversity on corporate leverage.  
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 7: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (n=78) 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
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ication 0.002 0.442 0.961 0.484 0.380 0.258 0.620 0.039 0.000 0.021 0.382 0.001   
Retail -0.041 0.050 -
0.132 
-
0.171 
0.026 0.229 -0.139 -0.050 0.012 -
0.030 
-
0.133 
-0.495 -0.195 
Trade 0.719 0.664 0.249 0.134 0.824 0.044 0.225 0.664 0.915 0.793 0.246 <.000
1 
0.087 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
